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Impact of Ageing for Social and Political 
Processes in Spain
Julio Pérez Díaz
About Spanish Demography
Spain is one of a group of European countries also called “Mediterranean”. This label, 
in demography, means “backward”, and a simple example may illustrate the reason. To 
make up for the frequent lack of empirical data, international models of mortality tables 
were created in the mid-20th century (Coale, Demeny and Vaughan, 1966). The Medi-
terranean model was then characterized by a low life expectancy, and very affected by 
high infant mortality rates. In 1900, life expectancy in Spain barely reached 34 years of 
age, and was the lowest of the continent, with the exception of Russia. Its main problem 
was high infant mortality, which was around 200%. 
Limited survival logically required higher fertility than the whole of Europe. The 
combined effect was little population growth and a very archaic age structure, with 
nearly a third under 16 years old and only 4% over age 64 (Livi Bacci, 1968). 
But the 20th century, and especially its second half, has completely changed the 
traditional situation, and Spain is now among the countries of the world with the high-
est life expectancy and lowest fertility, a combination that results in rapid population 
ageing. Generally, this evolution of the age pyramid is viewed with fear (it is symp-
tomatic to talk of its “impact”). It is thought to cause social stress and political and 
economic problems. This article, written by a demographer and from a demographic 
point of view, will hold a very different position. 
The “Population Ageing” Concept
This concept bears clarifying before proceeding. It is an unfortunate name that creates 
widespread misunderstandings, which results in many of its alleged consequences be-
ing simply myths. 
Back in the early decades of the 20th century, when such a process was beginning 
to be noticed in the most developed countries, the reaction was of alarm and rejec-
tion. It was associated with Western decline or national degeneration, topics that were 
in style at that time (Spengler, 1918). Organicism and Darwinian biologism applied to 
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societies led to the belief that populations were like living beings, that are born, mature 
and also grow old and die (Gini, 1930). 
But populations do not age, they do not grow old, they do not have an age, and we 
have had a century to see that the foreseen “decline” was a fallacy. What populations 
do, as they modernize, is modify their composition (their age structure), in a process 
whereby the traditional profile of the population pyramid is narrowed at the child and 
youth base, while gaining weight in favour of mature and advanced ages, which were so 
rare in the past. The conceptual trap implicit in the term “population ageing” is a legacy 
of which we have not yet divested ourselves, and which continues exerting its biased 
influence. 
That which is “old” still has negative connotations, so the ageing of the population 
cannot be good. But the theoretical foundations of such prejudice are easily refutable, 
and the historical reality doubly disproves it. It was important to start clarifying it, 
because the Spanish population is experiencing this trend with unprecedented intensity 
and speed, and the process is far from having reached its end.
The Change of the Pyramid 
The proportion of people over age 64 is increasing in Spain. It increased from 10% to 
17% between 1975 and 2010, and will still increase substantially in coming decades. 
But it would be a mistake to think that the normal population is what it was in 1975. 
The pyramid of 1975 shows how the civil war (1936-1939) and the low birth rate 
it caused left its mark on the limited number of people with ages around 25-30. Some-
thing similar happened in Europe with World War II, although this was some years 
later. But unlike the other European countries, Spain did not recoup its birth rate with 
the end of the war. The dictatorship and international isolation were accompanied by 
two decades of misery and few births, despite the state’s official pronatalistic policies.
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Graph 1: Spain Population Pyramids 1975 and 2010. 
Source: INE, Census Registry 1975, and 2010: INE Estimates of Spain’s Current Population (January 
1). 
The pyramid of 1975 is abnormal due to the extraordinary age 0 to 14 base, which is a 
result of the delayed baby-boom of the 1960s and which actually ended in 1975.
The 2010 pyramid is not “normal” either. It shows the pronounced baby-bust, after 
1975 that lasted 20 years. But also, the weight of the central adult ages, the most abun-
dant, has swelled even more due to an extraordinary flow of immigrants, unprecedented 
in a country which until now had been traditionally emigratory (Arango, 2004). We are 
thus faced with the results of a very intense fluctuation in the weight of children’s ages, 
first upward and then downward. It would be wrong to draw conclusions only from 
these two pyramids with regard to the causes of population ageing in Spain. 
In reality, the proportion of adults aged 64 and above has always grown throughout 
the 20th century. What can be observed in that historical constant are different rates. 
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Graph 2. Aged Population’s Annual Rate of Increase. Spain 1900-2025. 
Source: INE, Census, Demographic Patterns and Forecasts. 
After the extraordinary surge in the process during the baby-bust of the late 20th cen-
tury, in the last decade there was a reversal in the trend for the first time. But it was 
a mirage. What caused it may have been the very high immigration of young people, 
along with a moderate upturn in birth rate, as well as the retirement of the meagre 
generations born during the civil war. 
The mirage, nevertheless, quickly dissipates. The recent economic crisis has slowed 
immigration, as well as marriages and birthrates, but additionally the generations born 
in the 1950s and 1960s will now start to retire, and the adult weight will again grow sig-
nificantly over the whole, exceeding 20% probably within the next 15 years. This is not 
a circumstantial and passing trend, nor is it a rarity; the same can be seen in practically 
all developed countries. The main differences have got to be looked for in the historical 
moment in which the process began and the point where it currently is. 
The paradigm of early onset and gradual process is France, where mortality and 
fertility began to descend very early. By 1860 its adult population had reached a weight 
of 7% (while Spain did not reach until 1950) and it has taken 120 years to raise it to 
14%, which happened in Spain in just three decades. 
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Historical Moment When Adults Over 64 Reached 7%, 14%, and 21% of the Population. Spain and 
Several Countries of the World.
Source: Based on the idea of Mirkin and Weinberger (2001), updating the information with the UN’s 
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, in its median hypothesis, and dates for INE in Spain.
Notes. (1) The black vertical line separates real and projected data. (2) The ends of the horizontal bars 
indicate the time when the three percentages mentioned in the graph’s title are reached: 7% on the left 
end, 14% where the colour changes, and when 21% will be reached is on the far right end. (3) Some 
countries will not reach 21% before 2050, and has been drawn without the second segment.
There is a widespread belief that Spain is one of the most aged countries in Europe and 
the world, which is a false idea formed in the late 1990s, when the pace of population 
ageing was the most accelerated. At that time the population projections, if trends were 
prolonged indefinitely, effectively ended with Spain beating adult population records 
over a period of half a century. But the trend projections are simple exploratory tools, 
not predictions, and it is well known by demographers that trends behave cyclically, 
and not in a linear manner. Currently, the adult weight in Spain is very similar to that 
of Europe as a whole, and less than that already reached in large-weight countries like 
Germany or Italy. The extraordinary drop in the birth rate that began in 1975 bottomed 
out in the mid-1990s, to later reverse over more than a decade. 
In short, if what is being done is to observe the process of Spanish population age-
ing in an international context, Spain is late, but fast. It could be said that it is a “second 
wave” country, like Japan and Poland, but very advanced compared to those who joined 
this wave of change only after the second half of the 20th century. Some of these have 
not even reached 7% yet, though they evolve in that direction and such a proportion of 
adults is foreseen in the near future. These are countries of America, Asia and espe-
cially Africa, which share late and poor economic and social development. 
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The Consequences 
This change in the population pyramid has consequences in all areas of society, so they 
should be distinguished separately. There are automatic demographic consequences, 
which in demography is known as “structural effects”.
- Feminization: the ancient difference in mortality between men and women makes 
their numerical relationship increasingly unbalanced in favour of women, as the 
population ages. In Spain, there are twice as many women around age 80 as there 
are men. In an old pyramid this was not too important to the overall relationship 
between both sexes in the whole population. But with the new pyramid caused by 
population ageing, by increasing the weight of older adults, women are the ones 
who gain more presence. Today, women aged 65 or older already make up one-
tenth of the total Spanish population. 
- Overageing: As survival to early old age becomes more generalized, the number 
of people also reaching a very advanced age increases. Given that in the past sur-
vival to these ages was very rare, now they are the ones growing the fastest. 
- Increase in Disabilities and Dependency. Since health problems are directly re-
lated to age, population ageing increases its collective presence. In a country with 
an underdeveloped welfare state and very few supported by family solidarity, the 
growing weight of dependent care has had to be addressed as a matter of state. In 
2006, the “law of dependence” has literally created a fourth “leg” of the Spanish 
welfare state, along with health, education, and pensions.
There are many other socio-demographic areas in which the reconfiguration of the 
weight of the different ages produces automatic changes. Forms of cohabitation and 
household structures change with age, so the new pyramid itself implies greater weight 
to those who characterize ageing (Sánchez Vera, 1996). This factor is important, for 
example, in reducing the average size of Spanish households as a whole.
Typically, these changes are viewed with fear and, in fact, are often used to foresee 
serious problems in social and political areas as important as old age pensions, health-
care, care giving by relatives, or labour market competitiveness. Population projections 
virtually guarantee that in just two decades Spain will have its record share of older 
people when the central baby boom generations retire, exceeding ¼ of the total popula-
tion. 
The problem with projections is that they predict changes in a variable “with the 
rest of the conditions remaining the same”; meanwhile in this case we are dealing with a 
change, that of the population pyramid, which is impossible without changes occurring 
in many other conditions. Actually, the problems of population ageing have been incor-
rectly predicted for practically a century. Sometimes the insistence on alarms becomes 
ridiculous, because their founders age and die, and it is inherited by their disciples, and 
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the predictions are never borne out. One good example of this is the trend started in 
France in the middle of the pronatalistic fever by demographers like Sauvy or Boverat, 
and maintained by their student Gérard-François Dumont, coining the successful 
concept of “Demographic Winter”. Dumont, in turn, has aged while maintaining his 
speech unchanged (Dumont, 1979, 1995), and which reality has disproved for almost 
one hundred years.
A good way of tracking how the rest of the conditions surrounding the age struc-
ture have changed is to notice the characteristics of the generations turning age 65: the 
“new old” Spaniards, long overdue with respect to what happened in other developed 
countries, are revolutionizing the traditional sociological profile of old age. Recently 
turning age 65 are the first generations to achieve full schooling, the first to have an 
adult and working life uninterrupted by war, the first in which the majority was no lon-
ger of rural origin or working on a farm, and the first who enjoyed mass consumption 
of products such as cars or appliances. 
That is why it is important to understand what makes up the spectacular inter-
national modernization of population dynamics, because the ageing of the pyramid is 
only one of its expressions. 
The Reproductive Revolution
Actually, the pyramids are not the only things changing. The overall demographic sys-
tems have been changing for two centuries. It is not a progressive reform throughout 
human history, but an authentic revolution. 
Faced with the Demographic Transition Theory, which describes the change but is 
unable to explain its causal mechanisms, several authors have been proposing an alter-
native theory for some years, the Theory of the Reproductive Revolution1. We believe 
that what developed countries have achieved, and what practically all the others are on 
track to achieve, is a qualitative leap in the efficiency of their demographic systems. 
The analogies that general system theory provides are very useful here. Any open 
system, whatever its internal organization, endures over time by avoiding degradation 
and entropy. To that end, it includes external elements of limited duration that must be 
renovated, like human populations. “Demographic systems” feed on births and immi-
gration, and maintain populations over time even though its members, human beings, 
inevitably die. 
The greater or lesser efficiency of a system depends on the relationship between 
the results it achieves and the quantity of “input” required. Seen this way, human popu-
lations have always been very inefficient. In order to stay in existence, they needed a 
prodigious amount of births that, for the most part, never reached fertile ages. They 
1 Research with the support of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, VI Plan Nacional de I+D+I, 2008-2011, Ref: 
CSO2009-11571.
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were like a combustion engine that burns a lot of fuel, but loses a large part of the 
energy produced without converting it into work. 
The many children and the short life gave shape to the pyramid. It was very wide at 
the base, narrowed rapidly, and the mature and advanced ages had scarcely any weight. 
They were “young” pyramids. But they also determined the gender relationships, fam-
ily organizations or resource and care flows between the different generations present. 
Life was difficult for human beings until recently. 
In some parts of Europe, in the late 18th century, things began to change. For 
various reasons, high and unfortunate mortality, typical of all previous human history, 
began to decline. Population growth began to rise. Population pyramids became even 
younger again, because infant mortality was the first thing to improve. 
Only when survival improvements were strengthened did reproductive behaviours 
react adaptively, as fertility started the decline that led to the current very low rates. 
The Demographic Transition Theory has been criticized as a mere empirical gen-
eralization with no explanatory power (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2006). But it describes a 
far-reaching change for humanity. If it laid aside its conception of populations as mere 
stock (conception based on common annual and simultaneous death and birth rates), 
and dealt with the reproductive changes among generations, it would make full sense 
to speak of the greater or lesser efficiency of population reproduction. This is what we 
do with the Theory of the Reproductive Revolution (MacInnes and Pérez Díaz, 2009).
In our theoretical proposal, the reproductive revolution is only one of the “produc-
tive revolution” that is achieved by humanity in a continuous process of modernizing 
innovations, and has gained so much momentum since the industrial revolution. It is a 
question of a large-scale leap in efficiency with which human beings, in this case, are 
“produced”. 
From a strictly demographic point of view, this efficiency begins to increase when 
generational survival is “democratized” (affects the majority) until certain ages that 
represent important thresholds for population reproduction: first, it is essential to en-
sure survival of the majority until it reaches fertile ages; then, it is equally important 
to extend survival until middle age, living long enough to complete the parenting of 
the children, which I have elsewhere called the “maturity of the masses” (Pérez Díaz, 
2003b). Although these are “targets” that are apparently limited to the field of mortal-
ity, it is crucial to achieve them in order to dramatically increase the overall efficiency 
of reproductive systems. 
In all of human history prior to the reproductive revolution, only a small fraction 
of births lived long enough to be able to have their own children. The majority died 
much earlier. In more quantitative terms, the mortality rate was always above 200% in 
the first year of life, and the initial strength of each generation continued to erode very 
quickly in later childhood. Fifty per cent had died long before their early reproductive 
ages. 
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Under such conditions it is clear that the fertility of minority survivors had to be 
high, well above the two children per woman theoretically needed for generational 
replacement. And despite such high fertility, the result was very poor in terms of 
population reproduction, with a population growth rate of practically zero. The “inef-
ficiency” of the system here literally makes a lot of sense. Much is invested and very 
little is gained.
Therefore, the traditional young pyramids accompanying all of human history, with 
a large child presence, very short of adults, and practically no elderly people, may seem 
like “normal” pyramids and are most familiar and known to us, but in reality until a 
few decades ago have been a simple expression of reproductive delay and inefficiency.
Reproductive efficiency conditions other areas of social relations, starting with 
gender relations. In the past, women’s reproductive effort was of such intensity that it 
was their main occupation and the definition of the ancestral core of their own feminin-
ity. 
Also vital projects and collective enterprises were affected. Individuality of life 
interests and choices were almost meaningless, because the isolated individual was not 
able to succeed. 
Similarly, forms of cohabitation were rigidly restricted. The maximization of de-
scendents was always achieved in a precarious balance with available resources that 
were scarce and unstable, thus generating extensive and complex family formations. 
Couples had neither the means nor sufficient safety to address the reproductive “endea-
vour” alone and, moreover, other household structures were hardly avoidable, given the 
high probability for any of the adults in families dying “early”. 
All these are structural conditions that change when survival begins to become 
widespread. The democratization of life until youth ages is in itself a factor of reproduc-
tive success (populations grow faster, with the same number of births, if their “tenants” 
stay longer.) 
Democratization of life until middle age is another efficiency threshold because 
it allows raising one’s own children better and because it is a success that feeds itself: 
by increasing the proportion of each generation that can have children, the number of 
children each should have can decrease to ensure the same population volume. The job 
of having and raising the next generation is distributed better and among more people. 
Having fewer children and in better conditions closes the “virtuous circle”, be-
cause the new generations that are better cared for and looked after live even longer. A 
circularity of response factors leads to the current successful and efficient population 
dynamics. And, of course, to an entirely new population pyramid. 
Ageing and Reproductive Revolution in Spain
Spain seems to be an extreme case of rapid population ageing caused by the baby-
bust of the 1980s and 1990s. But it must be remembered that its demography is just 
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as extreme in everything that concerns the modernization process outlined above. At 
the start of the 20th century, life expectancy did not reach age 35 (many European 
countries were already around age 50), but a century later, at over age 80, it is among 
the highest in the world. 
Generational improvements in survival have been spectacularly speedy. That is 
the only explanation for the reproductive efficiency finally achieved, and therefore, the 
possibility of reducing fertility to extremes never before seen. It is this generational 
survival, and not that of isolated ages at each moment, which should be observed if we 
are to understand its impact on complete life cycles. 
“Maturity of the masses”, the threshold mentioned by which the majority of the 
generations are able to survive up to age 50, is achieved in Spain for the first time in the 
female generations born between 1901-1906—women who were age 50 in the second 
half of the 20th century.
Graph 3: Survival curves, Spanish Female Generations 1856-1960, emphasizing the first mass 
maturity birth cohort.
Source: Drawn with data from (Cabré i Pla 1989).
The delay in reaching this reproductive efficiency threshold is transmitted to many oth-
er features and behaviours, and gives a new explanation to the different international 
“social modernization” rhythms. Much has been speculated in Spain about the his-
torical or cultural factors that explained the earliness of some Nordic or Anglo-Saxon 
countries to adopt the new family or couple formations. This is what today is known as 
the Second Demographic Transition. Sweden’s low fertility and high female employ-
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ment contrasted with the archaic Spanish patterns still in the 1970s, and explanations 
were always sought in its political, ideological or cultural peculiarities. At the least, it 
is surprising that hardly any importance was given to the earliness at which the first 
Swedish generations were able to democratize survival to critical age thresholds, with 
its consequent effect on reproductive efficiency, compared to the Spanish delay in this 
crucial area of its population profile. 
Graph 4: First Mass Maturity in Four Countries (female birth cohorts): Sweden, Canada, France and 
Spain.
Source: (Pérez Díaz 2003b).
Any basic demographic analysis manual explains that overall fertility indicators are an 
instrumental fiction. They construct a hypothetical generation of women free of mor-
tality and tell us how many children they would have if, throughout their life, they were 
having children at each age with the same intensity that women have had in each age 
over the course of any given year. But that deliberately ignores how many women of 
that hypothetical generation would have survived from birth to puberty, or how many 
would die during their fertile years, or how long they would live after being mothers, or 
how long the children they brought into the world would live. Demography “analyses” 
and separates fertility in its “pure form” from the rest of the other determinants that 
affect reproduction, especially mortality.
Spain provides good examples of the difference between fertility and reproduc-
tion: the generations of women born between 1871-1875 had more than 4.5 children per 
woman, but their generational reproduction barely exceeded replacement (one daughter 
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per woman born in her mother’s generation). With improved survival, the generations 
of 1936-1940 achieved the same rate of reproduction, but with almost two children less 
per woman (2.6). This is what I described above as greater reproductive efficiency, 
and is the reason why Spain, after the scarce growth of the 19th century, and after a 
20th century of steady decline in fertility, has gone from 18 million to over 40 million 
people. 
In short, then, population ageing is no more than the result of a better way to main-
tain human populations, with a much more efficient yield for each new life brought to 
the world. From the standpoint of the demographic transition, it may seem like just a 
by-product, an unintended consequence; from the standpoint of the reproductive revo-
lution, it is an essential part of the process, a part of it. 
The decline in fertility is explained in this context, at least from a long-range his-
torical standpoint. We are too focused on the small differences, of tenths sometimes, in 
the fertility of the more developed countries, and too often we search for explanations 
in extra-demographic and cultural determinants. But the modernization of fertility and 
age structure are not a circumstantial or accidental issue, or the result of recent tax 
or family policies, housing prices, labour market conditions, or relationship patterns 
between young people today. 
They are a result of a large-scale change in the survival and reproduction of human 
beings, that will still become more pronounced in coming decades, and that leads us 
irreversibly to a new population equilibrium typical of the wildest prophecies. 
Conclusions
If I have disappointed those who hoped for a new repetition of the usual alarms about 
the social, political, and economic consequences of population ageing, I hope at least 
to have been able to explain the reasons. Such alerts are based on predictions that never 
come true. They are reproduced as part of the “consensus” in the field of demography 
(O.N.U. 1956), without anyone feeling forced to later explain why they were not right. 
But in science, errors should serve to review the assumptions and to make different 
predictions again later. Someone should try to explain sometime why population ageing 
is almost perfectly correlated with levels of wealth and international wellbeing, and not 
vice versa. Spain, of course, does not negate this relationship, but quite the opposite: it 
has only prospered while the proportion of adults went from just 4% a century ago to 
the current 18% today.
The theory of the reproductive revolution is a good explanation, not just of the 
change in population dynamics and its consequent effect on the population pyramid, 
but of the reasons as to why that change is positive and does not cause any of the pre-
dicted catastrophes.
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In fact, demographic change has enabled greater social and family investment in 
children, so that human and social capital in Spain has increased dramatically. This 
has made the economy more productive, and has opened a new and abundant labour 
pool, women, now much less obligated to perform reproductive tasks. It is not even 
true that it overloads healthcare systems; it is the changes in consumption patterns and 
the modernization of systems which explain most of the increase in health spending in 
developed countries (Dormont, Grignon and Huber, 2006)
Logically, there has not been the ever-announced intergenerational conflict (Arber 
and Attias-Donfut, 2007) because the ageing of the population does not drive a wedge 
between the different ages as if they were independent, organized groups fighting for 
the same resources. Demographic change, however, has consolidated the family and 
has made it the institution most valued by Spanish youth. 
Elsewhere I have speculated on the possible reconfiguration of gender and age roles 
in a direction that may just be provocative, but I cannot resist showing this graphically 
here:
Graph 5: Ideal Scheme of Possible Change in the Distribution of Roles by Sex and Age.
Source: (Pérez Díaz 2003a).
The mere fact that the pyramid has changed and there is a better balance among all ages 
has also had positive consequences for the productive economy (Gómez and Hernández 
de Cos, 2006). A profile of more diverse users and consumers makes the markets more 
stable as opposed to the sectoral crises, and the new old age is opening up consumption 
and basic service sectors for the Spanish economy and, actually, for all demographi-
cally advanced countries, as acknowledged even in the US (Krugman, 2005). 
What has been extended has not been old age, but youth. Those born in Spain in 
the early 20th century began working at an average age of 13 and became adults very 
soon, and elderly people, too. Today in Spain a 40-year-old person is considered young, 
and that is directly related to the support and resources transferred by the elders to the 
youngest, and with the simple fact that they remain alive for many more years. In a 
country with an underdeveloped welfare state and strongly based on family care, the 
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growing proportion of people in middle age or early old age has been of great help for 
other ages. Those are the ages that help in caring for their grandchildren (in the absence 
of public support in work-family reconciliation, health services, or day care) and also 
for their older relatives. A new social actor has appeared, therefore, with a growing 
demographic weight that has opened up new possibilities of relationships and family 
strategies. Let us not receive it with fear. 
Julio Pérez Díaz is a Tenured Scientist at the Spanish Council for Scientific Research. 
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0-14 15-64 > 64 Total
1900 6,240,701 11,408,535 968,849 18,618,086
1910 6,792,408 12,097,011 1,106,628 19,996,046
1920 6,914,876 13,254,350 1,220,617 21,389,842
1930 7,494,647 14,835,000 1,434,558 23,764,205
1940 7,748,951 16,438,632 1,690,388 25,877,971
1950 7,337,386 18,615,864 2,023,505 27,976,755
1960 8,361,283 19,643,207 2,508,515 30,513,005
1965 8,800,620 20,443,436 2,862,816 32,106,872
1970 9,459,640 21,290,338 3,290,679 34,040,657
1975 9,744,457 22,510,040 3,757,754 36,012,251
1981 9,685,730 23,760,901 4,236,727 37,683,358
1986 8,643,897 25,140,028 4,689,407 38,473,332
1991 7,532,668 25,969,348 5,370,252 38,872,268
1996 6,361,626 27,111,282 6,196,472 39,669,380
2001 5,932,653 27,956,202 6,958,516 40,847,371
2006 6,341,606 30,108,189 7,308,455 43,758,250
2010 6,868,095 31,406,561 7,742,899 46,017,555
2030 6,574,887 29,791,620 11,192,699 47,559,206
Population of Spain from 1900 to 2010. Large age groups (absolute numbers).
Source: INE, Census, Census Registrations and corresponding census renewals.
0-14 15-64 > 64 (>64)/(<15)
1900 33.5% 61.3% 5.2% 16
1910 34.0% 60.5% 5.5% 16
1920 32.3% 62.0% 5.7% 18
1930 31.5% 62.4% 6.0% 19
1940 29.9% 63.5% 6.5% 22
1950 26.2% 66.5% 7.2% 28
1960 27.4% 64.4% 8.2% 30
1965 27.4% 63.7% 8.9% 33
1970 27.8% 62.5% 9.7% 35
1975 27.1% 62.5% 10.4% 39
1981 25.7% 63.1% 11.2% 44
1986 22.5% 65.3% 12.2% 54
1991 19.4% 66.8% 13.8% 71
1996 16.0% 68.3% 15.6% 97
2001 14.5% 68.4% 17.0% 117
2006 14.5% 68.8% 16.7% 115
2010 14.9% 68.2% 16.8% 113
2030 13.8% 62.6% 23.5% 170
Population of Spain from 1900 to 2010. Large age groups (relative numbers) and relationship between 
the elderly and children.
Source: INE, Census, Census Registrations and corresponding census renewals.
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